Richmond Public Interest Law Review
Volume 21
Issue 1 General Assembly in Review

Article 4

10-20-2017

Slaying the Gerrymander: How Reform Will
Happen in the Commonwealth
Brian Cannon
Ben Williams

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr
Part of the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons
Recommended Citation
Brian Cannon & Ben Williams, Slaying the Gerrymander: How Reform Will Happen in the Commonwealth, 21 Rich. Pub. Int. L. Rev. 23
(2017).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Richmond Public Interest Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Cannon and Williams: Slaying the Gerrymander: How Reform Will Happen in the Commonweal
Do Not Delete

10/19/17 10:01 AM

SLAYING THE GERRYMANDER: HOW REFORM WILL
HAPPEN IN THE COMMONWEALTH
Brian Cannon* & Ben Williams**

* Brian Cannon is an adjunct professor at University of Richmond School
of Law. He serves as the Executive Director of OneVirginia2021, a transpartisan organization seeking to end gerrymandering once and for all prior
to the 2021 redistricting cycle.
** Ben Williams is a third-year law student at William & Mary Law School
in Williamsburg, Virginia. He served as a legal intern for OneVirginia2021
and DurretteCrump, the law firm handling OneVirginia2021’s compactness
lawsuit. He plans on pursuing a career in election law upon graduation in
May 2018.
23

Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2017

1

Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 4
Do Not Delete

24

10/19/17 10:01 AM

RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXI:i

ABSTRACT
Gerrymandering is a political tool that snuck its way into Virginia politics long ago. It has become problematic over time, threatening true democracy in the Commonwealth. This article outlines what those problems are,
how other states reacted to similar issues, and what Virginia politicians
have done to respond to gerrymandering. It offers proposed solutions to the
issues, and calls upon the Virginia General Assembly and elected governor
to take action.
INTRODUCTION
The word “gerrymander” is a familiar one in the American lexicon, but
its origins are known by very few. Its dictionary definition is “to divide [a
territorial unit] into election districts to give one political party an electoral
majority in a larger number of districts while concentrating the voting
1
strength of the opposition into as few districts as possible.” It is a portmanteau of the last name of the Ninth Governor of Massachusetts, Elbridge
Gerry, and a salamander—a reference to the grotesque, salamander-esque
districts Gerry approved of while Governor to give his DemocraticRepublicans electoral dominance in the Bay State.
The practice of gerrymandering actually began a generation before Gerry’s fateful foray into rigging his state’s congressional and legislative districts. Its first known use was by the honorable Virginia gentleman Patrick
Henry, who redrew a district in 1788—just after Virginia voted to ratify the
U.S. Constitution—to force his political rival James Madison into a district
2
with James Monroe. While Henry’s trick was ultimately unsuccessful and
Madison held onto his seat, it reaffirms the fact that, like most things Amer3
ican, the practice of gerrymandering is first and foremost Virginian.
From the early republic to the present day, gerrymandering has played a
continued role in political life. But its severity has increased in recent years,
1

Gerrymander, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/gerrymander (last visited Oct. 14, 2017).
2
Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers: Who’s Most to Blame for our Divisive Politics?, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-leagueof/309084/.
3
GerryRIGGED: Turning Democracy on its Head, ONEVIRGINIA2021 (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.onevirginia2021.org/about/gerryrigged/.
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as the two main political parties have become more ideologically polar4
ized. This polarization has only been exacerbated by the rise in advanced
mapping software which allows for gerrymandering to be done with a pre5
cision never before seen. As the slippery slope of gerrymandered partisan
extremism leads America downward into the abyss, only two entities can
save us: (a) an engaged polity which makes supporting reform a prerequisite to securing reelection, and (b) the courts. OneVirginia2021 believes
that while the courts can help to create legal standards which alleviate the
worst excesses of partisanship, the legislature is—ultimately—the only way
6
to permanently banish gerrymandering from our political culture.
Part I of this article will discuss the recent history of gerrymandering in
Virginia, with an eye to the shared culpability among the two major parties.
It will then dive into the major legal challenges to the post-2010 census
maps in Virginia and how they have already resulted in courts declaring the
legislature’s grotesque creations unconstitutional. It will then delve further
into explaining the role of technology in gerrymandering and how the structure of Virginia’s government makes reform more difficult than it is in
many other states. Part II of this article will discuss OneVirginia2021’s
“three tiers” of reforms, with examples of states which have achieved them
and leaders in the General Assembly who want to see them enacted here. It
concludes with advice to the future governor of Virginia, who will be elected in November 2017 and take office in January 2018.
I. HISTORY OF GERRYMANDERING & CURRENT ISSUES
A. Recent History of Gerrymandering in Virginia
For most of the 20th Century, the rural-urban divide provided the main
tension in Virginia's redistricting.7 After passage of civil rights legislation
8
9
1960s and the one person-one vote jurisprudence in the early 1980s, Vir4
See, e.g., Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and
Partisan Antipathy Affects Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 29,
2017), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/.
5
See DAVID DALEY, RATF**KED: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE SECRET PLAN TO STEAL AMERICA’S
DEMOCRACY 51–82 (Liveright Pub. 2016).
6
See GerryRIGGED: Turning Democracy on its Head, supra note 3 (discussing the merits of the legislative and litigation strategies utilized by reformers to end gerrymandering in Virginia).
7
Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, A Half-Century of Virginia Redistricting Battles: Shifting
from Rural Malapportionment to Voting Rights to Public Participation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 771, 782-90
(2013).
8 Id. at 779–82.
9 Id. at 782–87.
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ginia’s multi-member districting system was struck down.10 This forced a
11
special election for the House of Delegates in 1982. Less than a decade
later, the 1991 redistricting was particularly vicious to Republicans. For example, in Virginia's seventh congressional district, George Allen was gerrymandered into a district with a popular colleague by some creative cartography within weeks of his special election to Congress.12 On top of this,
Governor Douglas Wilder repeatedly vetoed proposed General Assembly
district maps and favored the creation of majority African-American districts.13
Redistricting in the 1990s produced the long-anticipated republicancontrolled General Assembly. Prior to this, Democrats controlled the General Assembly uninterrupted until the late 1990s, while Republicans con14
trolled the 2001 redistricting completely. Republicans not only controlled
the General Assembly, but also elected Governor Jim Gilmore who held
(but did not use) the veto pen that might have been used by a Democratic
15
governor. In response to a loss of control, Democrats filed multiple law16
suits that ultimately amounted to nothing. The 2001 redistricting further
cemented the GOP control of the General Assembly.
In 2011, there was a promising potential for redistricting reform, because
neither party had a monopoly on the redistricting process. It was a unique
moment in Virginia’s redistricting history, because it was the first time
since 1900 that the General Assembly’s partisan control was split during a
17
redistricting year. Democrats controlled the Senate and Republicans con18
trolled the House of Delegates. Urged by supporters of fair redistricting,
Governor Bob McDonnell appointed the Independent Bipartisan Advisory
Redistricting Commission (IBARC) through Executive Order No. 31.19
IBARC held multiple public meetings that provided them with input on
good government principles as applied to the unique challenges in Virgin-

10

See generally Cosner v. Dalton, 552 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1981) (holding that population deviations
violated the Equal Protection Clause without justification).
11 Altman & McDonald, supra note 7, at 786.
12
EDWARD A. LYNCH, STARTING OVER: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE ALLEN 66 (2010).
13
John F. Harris, Wilder Draws Praise in Redrawing Congressional Map, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 1991),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1991/12/03/wilder-draws-praise-in-redrawingcongressional-map/c7a28d4e-cc93-4e73-9fcd-cdd57d4820fb/?utm_term=.6a47e9d797d5.
14 Altman & McDonald, supra note 7, at 790–91.
15
Id. at 790.
16
Id. at 790–91.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 795.
19
Robert F. McDonnell, Gov. of Va., Exec. Order No. 31 (Jan. 10, 2011),
https://commonwealth.virginia.gov/media/2196/Gubernatorial-Documents.pdf.
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20

ia’s redistricting. As a result, IBARC produced a report with multiple recommendations for the General Assembly.21
Simultaneously, professors from Christopher Newport University and
George Mason University teamed up to create a college student redistricting
22
competition across the state. This was “the first time in American history
that such a competition was held while a state’s redistricting process was
underway, and the first to generate a legal plan.”23 The students were given
the new census data and technology similar to that used by the redistricting
24
professionals. The student competition generated 16 teams and 55 different maps.25 In their article "A Half-Century of Virginia Redistricting Battles: Shifting from Rural Malapportionment to Voting Rights to Public Participation," Altman and McDonald analyzed the various plans and found the
student maps were superior to the partisan maps that were ultimately adopted on multiple good-governance criteria such as compactness.26 However,
the General Assembly’s split chambers ignored both the IBARC recommendations and student maps, and drew a district map that eventually produced a 100 percent re-election rate for the entire incumbent class of Gen28
eral Assembly members in 2015.27 It also triggered multiple lawsuits.
The General Assembly did not redraw the congressional districts in
29
2011, however, preferring to redraw them during the 2012 session. After
the intervening General Assembly elections in November 2011, Republicans took control of the Virginia Senate and possessed a political monopoly
to complete the decennial redistricting in 2012.30 Democrats challenged

20

INDEP. BIPARTISAN ADVISORY COMM’N ON REDISTRICTING, COMMONWEALTH OF VA., THE PUBLIC
INTEREST IN REDISTRICTING 10 (2011).
21
Id. at 20.
22
Altman & McDonald, supra note 7, at 792.
23
Id. at 793.
24
Id.
25
See VIRGINIA REDISTRICTING COMPETITION,
https://sites.google.com/a/varedistrictingcompetition.org/public/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).
26
Altman & McDonald, supra note 7, at 793.
27
Stephen J. Farnsworth, The 2015 Election in Virginia: A Tribute to Gerrymandering, WASH. POST
(Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/05/the-2015-election-invirginia-a-tribute-to-gerrymandering/?utm_term=.127e690deca7.
28
See Jenna Portnoy, A Third Redistricting Lawsuit Targets Va. Elections Map, WASH. POST (Sept. 14,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/a-third-redistricting-lawsuit-targets-vaelections-map/2015/09/14/6eacaed0-5afb-11e5-9757e49273f05f65_story.html?utm_term=.732f249207fb
29
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-508 (2017).
30
See Geoffrey Skelley, Virginia’s Redistricting History: What’s Past is Prologue, UNIV. OF VA. CTR.
FOR POLITICS: SABATO’S CRYSTAL BALL (June 18, 2015),
http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/virginias-redistricting-history-whats-past-isprologue/.
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this maneuver, but the suit was dismissed by a circuit court in February
2012.31
B. Post-2011 Legal Challenges to Gerrymanders
After Democrats gerrymandered the Senate, Republicans gerrymandered
the House of Delegates, and both rejected independent map proposals, the
only possible outlet for voters to vindicate their rights lay in the courts.
These cases can be divided into three categories: (i) racial gerrymandering
claims against the congressional map; (ii) racial gerrymandering claims
against the House of Delegates map; and (iii) compactness claims against
the Senate and House of Delegates maps.
1. Racial Gerrymandering of the Congressional Map
The major racial gerrymandering case against the Congressional map is
32
Personhuballah v. Alcorn. The plaintiffs, a group of residents in Virginia’s third congressional district, filed suit alleging that their district was an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander, because race had been the predominant
33
factor in its creation. Citing Shelby County v. Holder, their complaint argued that African-American populations in the surrounding districts were
reduced, because the congressional map "packed" black voters into the third
district.34 Additionally, the complaint noted that the 56.3 percent black
makeup of the third district was far more than necessary to satisfy Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act, which was the only significant provision remaining in the Voting Rights Act after the coverage formula of Section 5 was
found to be unconstitutional.35
Just over a year after filing the complaint, a three-judge District Court
panel found for the plaintiffs and struck down the third district boundary
lines as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, because it was not narrowly
tailored to its compelling interest in gaining preclearance under the thenvaild Section 5 scheme.36 The United States Supreme Court vacated the
31

Little v. Va. St. Bd. of Elections, No. CL11-5253, slip op. at 1, 13 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 27, 2012).
Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552 (E.D. Va. 2016).
33
Id. at 556.
34
Complaint at 1–2, Page v. Va. St. Bd. of Elections, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73514 (E.D. Va. 2015)
(No. 3:13CV678) (citing Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)) (holding the coverage formula provided in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act as unconstitutional) [hereinafter Page II].
35
Id. at 9; see also Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (overturning the coverage formula found in Section
4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, which delineated the jurisdictions subject to preclearance under Section
5).
36
Page v. Va. St. Bd. of Elections, 58 F. Supp. 3d 533, 541 (E.D. Va. 2014), vacated sub nom. Cantor v.
Personhuballah, 135 S. Ct. 1699 (2015) [hereinafter Page I].
32
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District Court panel’s opinion in light of Alabama Legislative Black Caucus
v. Alabama and remanded the case for reconsideration consistent with that
opinion.37 Following the remand, the same three-judge District Court panel
again struck down the map as a racial gerrymander and determined that the
plan was not narrowly tailored to the Commonwealth’s compelling interest
in complying with the Voting Rights Act.38
2. Racial Gerrymandering of the General Assembly Map
Currently, Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections is a racial gerry39
mandering case against the House of Delegates map. The plaintiffs are
residents of majority-minority House of Delegates districts, which were
subject to a 55 percent black racial threshold to avoid retrogression under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.40 In a memorandum opinion, a threejudge District Court panel found that all but one of the challenged districts
41
did not constitute a racial gerrymander. They The court sided with the
42
Commonwealth and dismissed plaintiffs’ complaints. Plaintiffs appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, which vacated the panel’s opinion on
11 of the 12 House of Delegates districts and remanded it for further consideration consistent with Alabama Legislative Black Caucus.43 The case is
currently before the District Court panel again.44
3. Compactness Challenge to the General Assembly Map
Vesilind v. Virginia State Board of Elections is the third case challenging
the 2011 maps drawn by the General Assembly, and it involves a challenge
under the delineated criteria for district drawing in the Virginia Constitu45
tion. Article II, Section 6 of the Virginia Constitution contains the only
mandatory criteria for redistricting at the state level: the districts must be

37

Id.
Page II, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73514, at *18–19.
39
See Bethune-Hill v. Va. St. Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017).
40
Complaint at 1–2, Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. 788 (No. 3:14CV852).
41
See Bethune-Hill v. Va. St. Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505 (E.D. Va. 2015).
42
Id. at 571.
43
Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 802.
44
Order Setting Hearing Date, Bethune-Hill v. Va. St. Bd. of Elections, No. 3:14CV852 (E.D. Va. Aug.
24, 2017). In addition to the remanding order from the case, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cooper v.
Harris will further impact the analysis of the three-judge district court panel. An important footnote in
Harris said that “the sorting of voters on the grounds of their race remains suspect even if race is meant
to function as a proxy for other (including political) characteristics.” See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct.
1455, 1473–74 (2017).
45
See Vesilind v. Va. St. Bd. of Elections, No. CL15-3886 (Va. Cir. 2016).
38
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contiguous, compact, and be as equal in population as is practicable.46 The
case was brought by plaintiffs residing in six House of Delegates districts
and five Senate districts that the complaint argues were extremely noncompact.47
Plaintiffs used the "predominance test" theory to advance their argu48
ment. The theory suggests two types criteria that can be used to structure
redistricting: "mandatory" criteria and non-mandatory "discretionary" criteria. "Mandatory" criteria include requirements of the U.S. Constitution, federal statutory law, and the state constitution. This includes "one person, one
vote" and prohibitions on racial gerrymandering handed down by the U.S.
49
Supreme Court, as well as Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits redistricting plans that dilute the votes of minority voters.50 Additionally, the Virginia Constitution requires contiguity, compactness, and populations as equal across districts as practicable.51 "Discretionary" criteria
include protecting incumbents or gaining partisan advantage. Under this
theory, discretionary criteria cannot be given more weight than mandatory
52
criteria. Thus, a proposed map would be compared district-by-district
against a “max-compact” plan, which creates districts that are as compact as
practicable while complying with federal criteria. The plaintiffs argued that
if the compactness of the districts in the proposed maps are less than half of
the level of compactness in the max-compact plan, then one would conclude
that discretionary criteria predominated over compactness and the districts
53
should be struck down as violations of the Virginia Constitution.
After a three-day trial, Judge W. Reilly Marchant of the Richmond City
54
Circuit Court issued an opinion largely siding with plaintiffs’ assertions.
He even noted that plaintiffs' predominance theory of compactness “merit[s] serious consideration.”55 However, Judge Marchant ruled that the "fairly debatable" standard of review for redistricting plans passed by the Gen56
eral Assembly forced him to uphold the map. Under the “fairly debatable”
46
VA. CONST. art. II, § 6. OneVirginia2021 supported the plaintiffs throughout this lawsuit and continues to do so while it is on appeal.
47
Opinion & Order at 5–6, Vesilind v. Va. St. Bd. of Elections, No. CL15-3886 (Va. Cir. Mar. 31,
2017).
48
Id. at 13–14,
49
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1963).
50
52 U.S.C. § 10,301; see, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (describing the conditions
under which Section 2 would require the creation of an additional majority-minority district).
51
VA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
52
See Opinion & Order, supra note 47, at 5.
53
Id. at 5–6.
54
Id. at 13–14.
55
Id. at 14–15.
56
Id. at 14.
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standard of review, “if the evidence offered by both sides of the case would
lead reasonable and objective persons to reach different conclusions, then
the legislative determination is ‘fairly debatable’ and must be upheld.”57
Judge Marchant concluded, thus, that under that lenient standard, the districts were constitutionally compact. The case is currently on appeal to the
Virginia Supreme Court.58
C. Why Gerrymandering Matters
Political and social scientists frequently note the increase in American
political polarization since the 1990’s.59 A 2014 Pew study found an increase in polarization and activism among those at either end of the political
spectrum, a declining political center, and an increased apathy for politics.60
In The Partisan Divide: Congress in Crisis, former Congressmen Tom Davis and Martin Frost, along with their co-author Richard Cohen, present the
likely reasons behind these trends.61 They group the systemic challenges to
self-governance into four categories: residential sorting, intellectual sorting,
62
money in politics, and gerrymandering. Each presents problems for drawing voting districts.
Residential sorting happens when people who share common interests
63
(often political and socio-economic) cluster together away from diversity.
In The Big Sort, Bill Bishop describes this phenomenon and the major implications it presents for our society and government.64 Bishop paints a picture of a diverse society from a macro view, like cities, that clusters into
65
like-minded group on a micro level, like borroughs or neighborhoods. Notably, Americans have sorted themselves into gated communities or neighborhoods of people with similar educational backgrounds and earning po-

57

Opinion & Order, supra note 47, at 14.
Evanne Armour, Group to File Appeal in Gerrymandering Lawsuit, WAVY-TV (Apr. 25, 2017, 10:03
PM), http://wavy.com/2017/04/25/group-to-file-appeal-in-gerrymandering-lawsuit/.
59
Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse M. Shapiro, & Matt Taddy, Measuring Polarization in High-Dimensional
Data: Method and Application to Congressional Speech 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper
No. w22423) (May 2017), https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/politext.pdf.
60
Political Polarization in the American Republic: How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan
Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 12, 2014),
http://www.peoplepress.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/.
61
TOM DAVIS, MARTIN FROST, & RICHARD COHEN, THE PARTISAN DIVIDE: CONGRESS IN CRISIS 2–3
(2013).
62
Id. at xiv–xv.
63
Id. at xv.
64
BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US
APART 5–6 (2008).
65
Id. at 5.
58
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66

tential.
Likewise, intellectual sorting occurs through media and social
media bubbles. Facebook newsfeeds pre-populate with opinions and articles
that we are inclined to “like” and, thereby, agree with and share.67 Over the
past decade, major media, like TV and print, changed leaving a distorted
picture of our country with ample room for the emergence of “fake news.”68
These two types of sorting drive polarization as our beliefs are continually
reinforced by our contacts. When combined with our high penchant for
moving and self-sorting, polarization becomes inevitable.69
In addition to sorting, there is also more money in American politics than
ever before and its effects on elections are quantifiable.70 Political action
committees (PACs), super PACs, and outside spending have eclipsed the
candidate committees which they indirectly support.71 Davis and Frost detail the ways extreme amounts of money can be contributed to any race in
the country or be use to target any audience.72 Smart companies like Cambridge Analytica are driving this micro-targeting to self-sorting neighbors in
their own media bubbles with almost limitless cash.73 Yet the biggest prize
in any election is control of the redistricting process. Any time and money
“invested” targeting specific voters with specific messages from outside organizations can be recouped if the district is drawn to maximize the incumbent’s “return.” Politicians can even draw-out their political opponents and
colleagues, and draw-in their supporters and donors using software de74
signed to deliver victories for the map-makers.
What makes gerrymandering unique among these several challenges to
self-governence is that it is the only challenge without First Amendment
protection. For example, campaign finance reform, like the McCainFeingold Act, faced historic defeats in the U.S. Supreme Court, because the

66

Id. at 50–51.
Mostafa M. El-Bermawy, Your Filter Bubble is Destroying Democracy, WIRED (Nov. 18, 2016, 5:45
AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/filter-bubble-destroying-democracy/.
68
Jack Shafer & Tucker Doherty, The Media Bubble Is Worse Than You Think, POLITICO MAGAZINE
(May/June 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/25/media-bubble-real-journalismjobs-east-coast-215048.
69
Adam Chandler, Why Do Americans Move So Much More Than Europeans?, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 21,
2016) https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/us-geographic-mobility/504968/.
70
Drew Desliver & Patrick Van Kessel, As More Money Flows into Campaigns, Americans Worry
About Its Influence, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/12/07/as-more-money-flows-into- campaigns-americans-worry-about-its-influence/.
71
Id.
72
Tom Davis & Richard Cohen, Moneyball, in THE PARTISAN DIVIDE: CONGRESS IN CRISIS 74, 74–81
(2014).
73
Alexander Nix, How big data got the better of Donald Trump, CAMPAIGN (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://www.campaignlive.co.uk/article/big-data-better-donald-trump/1383025.
74 Id.
67
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Court determined that money is speech protected by the First Amendment.75
Similarly, choosing where to live or what to "like" on Facebook is also pro76
tected by the First Amendment. But legislators cannot defend their gerrymandering on the basis of the First or Fourteenth Amendment, which offers
reformers an opportunity to change the system without fear that courts will
77
gut those reforms in the name of the First Amendment.
D. Evolving Technology & the "Perfection" of Gerrymandering
Early on, legislators poured over room-sized maps and used rudimentary
78
calculators or solved equations by hand to draw district lines. Even if legislators wanted to draw maps to their advantage, technological limits made
79
precision in gerrymandering practically impossible. This all changed with
the technological and computer revolutions. The same pioneers that brought
the world the iMac, Microsoft, and the Internet also brought redistricting
80
software into being and provided wide-spread access to it online. Some of
this software ultimately became available online, as exemplified by The
81
Redistricting Game. One program came to dominate the redistricting
world for its ability to target individual voters: Maptitude.82
83

Karl Rove pioneered the use of this technology for political gain. Then,
already involved in what would become the GOP’s post-2010 redistricting
strategy called REDMAP, Rove authored an article in the Wall Street Journal titled, “The GOP Targets State Legislatures,” with the subheading, “He
who controls redistricting can control congress.”84 By targeting the takeover
of state legislatures in states that would gain or lose congressional seats
(forcing them to make major revisions to their district maps), Republicans,
Rove argued, would be in a position to lock in a majority in Congress and
halt the agenda of President Obama.85 While Republicans ultimately took
control of Congress riding the Tea Party wave in 2010, the counter-wave in
75

Jeremy P. Jacobs, The Passion of McCain-Feingold, CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS (Apr. 25, 2010),
https://www.campaignsandelections.com/campaign-insider/the-passion-of-mccain-feingold.
76
Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013).
77
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004).
78
DALEY, supra note 5.
79
Id.
80
See THE REDISTRICTING GAME, http://www.redistrictinggame.org/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
81 Id.
82
See DALEY, supra note 5, at 51–82 (discussing how RedMap architects used Maptitude to gerrymander at a level not previously possible).
83
Id. at xvii.
84
See Karl Rove, The GOP Targets State Legislatures: He who controls redistricting can control congress, THE WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2010, 5:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703862704575099670689398044.
85
Id.
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2012 saw Democrats retain control of the White House and increase their
86
margins in the Senate. However, Republicans held on to the House de87
spite receiving over one-million fewer votes nationwide. With these election results in the books and seven years of Republican control of the House
of Representatives when they received fewer national vote totals than Dem88
ocrats in both 2012 and 2016, it begs the question: what about REDMAP
made it so devastatingly effective? To be sure, Democrats had attempted
their own gerrymandering following 2010, particularly in Illinois and Mary89
land, but as a whole their efforts were less effective.
Perhaps no better
evidence of this exists than the Virginia Senate, which Democrats gerry90
mandered in 2011, only to promptly lose control of the chamber.
What was REDMAP’s secret? REDMAP utilized advanced computer
software which could predict with striking accuracy the changes in de91
mographics that would occur over time in certain states. For example, a
computer could take information on the average income of certain neighborhoods and developers’ long-term plans for future regions (including the
prices of homes and condominiums in those areas) to predict the demo92
graphic makeup of those areas six, eight, or even ten years in the future.
When that information was compared against advanced statistical analyses
of how specific types of people were likely to vote, mapmakers could predict the partisan performance of individual blocks, neighborhoods, cities,
93
and entire districts years into the future. With all of this data, Maptitude
could produce maps which would statistically be the most advanced parti94
san maps possible.
When Democrats were burned by REDMAP in 2010, they made reversing the Republican Party’s gerrymandering one of its top priorities in the
upcoming years.95 The key problem is that one party or the other fighting
86 See David Daley, The House the GOP Built: How Republicans Used Soft Money, Big Data, and HighTech Mapping to Take Control of Congress and Increase Partisanship, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 24, 2016, 9:02
PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/04/gops-house-seats-are-safe-heres-why.html [hereinafter Daley, The House the GOP Built].
87 See id.
88 Id.
89
DALEY, supra note 5, at 216.
90 See Trip Gabriel, Redistricting in Virginia Hurts Blacks, Democrats Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/us/politics/virginia-senates-redistricting-is-protested.html.
91
See ‘Gerrymandering on Steroids’: How Republicans Stacked the Nation’s Statehouses, NPR: HERE
& NOW (July 19, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2016/07/19/gerrymandering-republicansredmap.
92
See Daley, The House the GOP Built, supra note 85.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
See Edward-Isaac Dovere, Obama, Holder to Lead Post-Trump Redistricting Campaign, POLITICO
(Oct. 17, 2016, 5:06 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/obama-holder-redistricting-
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for control of the redistricting process will never end gerrymandering, especially as Democrats have proven themselves completely willing to gerrymander when given the chance.96 This means that if Republicans in blue
states or Democrats in red states ever want to end gerrymandering once and
for all, the key will be to shift control away from legislators and their conflicts of interest and to independent redistricting commissions.97 Absolute
power corrupts absolutely, and the only way, we argue, to slay the gerrymander is to eliminate the power of the gerrymanderers to draw district
lines in the first place.
E. “Binding the Hands of Future Legislatures” and the Constitutional
Problem
Late in the summer of 2015, many staffers and supporters of the OneVirginia2021 team were working on a criteria bill to present to the General
Assembly. During the drafting process, a key procedural question often left
unanswered but critically important emerged: can the General Assembly
pass irreversible redistricting reform statutorily? The answer lies in a poorly
defined concept that is generally understood as “binding the hands of future
legislators.” The Virginia Constitution describes the authority of the General Assembly as extending to “all subjects of legislation not herein forbidden or restricted; and a specific grant of this authority in this Constitution
upon a subject shall not work a restriction of its authority upon the same or
any other subject.”98 This means that the General Assembly possesses the
power to pass laws regarding criteria to be considered during reapportionment. Additionally, “the General Assembly shall enact general laws. Any
general law shall be subject to amendment or repeal. . . ."99 Generally, this
provision and the prior one dovetail with the presumption that the Virginia
Constitution provides a broad grant of power to the Assembly, limited only
by specifically enumerated prohibitions within the Constitution itself. That
is, “The [Virginia] Constitution does not grant power to the General Assembly [. . .] it only restricts powers ‘otherwise practically unlimited.’”100
Under this framework, the General Assembly’s power to pass laws regarding redistricting criteria (or any other matter) must be subject to the General
gerrymandering-229868.
96
See Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Gerrymandering (O television broadcast Apr. 9, 2017).
97
See Benjamin Williams, Crafting Competitive Criteria: The Institution is Critical, WM & MARY
ELECTION L. SOC’Y (Oct. 5, 2016), http://electls.blogs.wm.edu/2016/10/05/crafting-competitive-criteriathe-institution-is-critical/.
98
VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14 (emphasis added).
99
Id. at § 15 (emphasis added).
100
FFW Enterprises v. Fairfax County, 701 S.E.2d 795, 801 (Va. 2010) (quoting Lewis Trucking Corp.
v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 747, 751 (Va. 1966)).
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Assembly’s equal power of repeal, as an irrevocable command would be a
non-constitutional reduction in the General Assembly’s plenary powers.101
The concept of “binding the hands of future legislatures” has been a part
of Virginia law since Reconstruction. As early as 1872, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the legislature cannot be bound or controlled by an
action of a previous legislature.102 Virginia’s Division of Legislative Ser103
vices endorsed the concept in a brief it issued to legislators in 1996.
Composed by a senior attorney, the brief compared a Nebraska budget law
104
to a Virginia budget law. The brief noted that every Virginia budget contains a clause declaring that the budget supersedes all other statutory provisions with which it is in conflict, thus, preventing the “binding of hands”
problem from ever occurring.105
II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. OneVirginia2021's “Three Tiers” of Reforms
Reformers at OneVirginia2021 adopted a three-tiered strategy that recognizes the often incremental approach legislation takes in Virginia. Based
on meetings with supporting organizations and legislators, OneVirgin106
ia2021 adopted a “gold, silver, and bronze” plan approach to reform.
Collectively, these plans account for various degrees of skepticism inherent
in reluctant legislators to give up their power to an independent commission. Bills falling in this tier structure have had senior Republican and
107
Democratic sponsorship in the General Assembly.
The “bronze plan” is a constitutional amendment, which adds a single
line to Article II, Section 6 of the Virginia Constitution, prohibiting political
gerrymandering by stating: “No electoral district shall be drawn for the pur101

VA. CONST. art. IV, § 15.
See Antoni v. Wright, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 833, 848 (1872) (“It is unquestionably true, that one legislature cannot, by an act of ordinary legislation, bind or control, in any manner, subsequent Legislatures.
Such acts of legislation are, and of right should be, always subject to amendment or repeal.”).
103
JOAN E. PUTNEY, COMMONWEALTH OF VA. DIV. OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, BINDING THE HANDS OF
FUTURE
LEGISLATORS:
THE
NEBRASKA
V.
MOORE
CASE
3
(1996),
http://dls.virginia.gov/pubs/briefs/BRIEF15.HTM.
104
Id. at 2–3.
105
See id. at 3.
106
See generally Fair Criteria, ONEVIRGINIA2021 (2016), https://www.onevirginia2021.org/about/faircriteria/ (describing bi-partisan support for redistricting legislation and the work of the coalition).
107
See, e.g., S.J. Res. 290, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017); S.J. Res. 231, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017); S.B. 846, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017); H.R.J. Res. 763,
2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017); H.R.J. Res. 696, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
102
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pose of favoring or disfavoring any political party, incumbent legislator,
108
member of Congress, or other individual or entity.” This would not completely eliminate the conflict of interest that arises from districts being
drawn by those whose jobs directly depend on those districts. However, it
does curb the worst excesses of gerrymandering by mandating that there be
a compelling reason for drawing the lines other than for the benefit of a par109
ty or politician. It also gives the courts a standard to use when evaluating
the reasoning behind the maps. The “purpose” language is a slightly elevated standard that should also serve to minimize frivolous litigation. It is a
higher standard than any other element of Article II, Section 6 of the Vir110
ginia Constitution.
While the act of drawing a line will always benefit
some to the detriment of others, this minimalist approach would curb the
more brazen partisanship and incumbency protection schemes so common
111
in the General Assembly and as evinced by court cases this decade.
The “silver plan” uses the same language as above but adds additional
proscriptive, non-partisan criteria that must be followed when drawing district maps. These criteria include the existing requirements that districts be
contiguous, compact, and of equal population, plus new ones such as honoring preexisting political subdivisions, keeping voting precincts from being
112
Florida is the best
split, and keeping communities of interest together.
example of a state that has enacted silver-plan-style reforms by using "identical territory" for keeping communities of interest together.113 Although it
does not include a commission, it is proscriptive enough to make blatant
114
gerrymandering illegal and difficult to achieve.
The “gold plan” combines the above non-partisan criteria, but also addresses the conflict of interest issue by creating an independent commis115
The proposed independent commission is comprised of seven
sion.
members: four partisans and three non-partisans. Here, "independent"
means that the members are not part of the General Assembly, but not necessarily politically independent. The four partisans would be appointed by
108

S.J. Res. 290, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
For recent literature on the idea of partisan intent and the invidiousness of drawing lines for such purposes, see Justin Levitt, Intent is Enough: Invidious Partisanship in Redistricting, 59 W&M L. Rev.
__(forthcoming 2017) (currently available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3011062).
110
VA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
111
See, e.g., Bethune-Hill, No. 3:14CV852 ; Vesilind, No. CL15-3886.
112 S.J. Res 290, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017) (proposed amendment to the Virginia Constitution that incorporates OneVirginia2021’s “Silver Plan”).
113
FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16.
114 S.J. Res. 290, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
115 S.J. Res. 231, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017) (proposed resolution that encompassed the
independent commission from OneVirginia2021’s “Gold Plan”).
109
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the General Assembly, one each by the majority and minority party in both
chambers. These members cannot be legislators, their spouses, or lobbyists.
The other three members of the commission would be bureaucrats who
are accustomed to operating in their roles as non-partisan actors: the Inspector General, the Auditor of Public Accounts, and the Executive Director of
the State Bar Association. They also derive their appointments from each of
the three branches of government. The Inspector General is appointed by
116
The Auditor of
the Governor and confirmed by the General Assembly.
117
Public Accounts is entirely selected by the General Assembly.
The Director of the Bar is selected by the Virginia Bar Association itself and con118
firmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Many commissions fall short by requiring a simple majority of votes to
pass a map, thus making one person a “swing” vote on the commission.
This method vests a great deal of authority in one person. Thus, the proposed commission would require a supermajority of five votes, and the two
“no” votes could not be the two Democratic appointees or the two Republican appointees. This allows each party enough votes to veto a map, but not
119
enough to force a partisan map through.
B. Reform Bills in the 2017 General Assembly
With these reform plans in mind, we can consider legislative approaches
to reform that were introduced in the General Assembly this year. Some on120
ly included criteria,
others only included structure and procedure rules
121
for commissions,
and one included everything and fits the approach of
122
the gold plan. Unfortunately, all of these bills have one thing in common:
they failed to pass the General Assembly. While the Senate bills passed that
chamber, all of the bills died in House committees in the early hours of the
123
morning.
One of the reasons these bills all died was a lack of political
trust between the parties. Until the parties are able to trust that the other is
not attempting undermine the other, a system based on trust, such as the
system Iowa uses, seems out of reach in Virginia.

116

VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-308 (2011).
Id. § 30-130 (2001).
118 Id. § 54.1-3910 (2002); VA. SUP. CT. R. PT. 6, § 4 (2011).
119 S.J. Res. 284, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2015) (proposing to amend Section 6 of Article II
of the Virginia Constitution).
120
See, e.g., S.B. 1410, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
121
See, e.g., S.B. 1133, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
122 See S.J. Res. 231, 2017 Gen. Assembl., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
123 Id.
117
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While many of the above bills would be preferable to Virginia’s current
redistricting system had they not died in committee, none of them came
close to what some have called a model for redistricting reformers: the Iowa
system.124 Alone among the 50 states, Iowa delegates the primary duty of
drawing district lines to its nonpartisan legislative services staff. In Iowa,
the Department of Legislative Services (DLS) committee tasked with redistricting is forbidden from considering the addresses of incumbents, prior
125
maps, or partisan political data. The result is maps that can change radically from decade-to-decade. But in Iowa, trust in the system is so high that
the legislature has never reverted to passing one of its own maps, even
though they would be entirely within their rights to do so. Iowa’s system
only gives DLS three attempts to draw maps the legislature can approve; if
126
they fail, the legislature will draw its own maps. Additionaly, this statutory system could be repealed by the Iowa Legislature at any time. In the
General Assembly in 2017, Sen. Lynwood Lewis (D-Accomac) introduced
a bill that would have brought Virginia one step closer to the Iowa plan by
adding stringent criteria to the Virginia Constitution.127
Unfortunately, the Iowa system contains several problems which make
its compatibility with Virginia improbable. First, it requires a political culture of relative comity and trust in nonpartisan institutions. Virginia’s pullno-punches politics may one day become the genteel culture some like to
pretend it is and always has been, but at the present time it is hard to imagine the General Assembly coalescing around a statutory solution to redistricting that relies on political trust between the parties. Second, Iowa’s system grants original jurisdiction to the state Supreme Court to resolve any
redistricting problems.’128 Virginia’s appointment and retention system creates a tug of authority over its Supreme Court justices, which would likely
make them highly reluctant to strike down one thing legislators care about
most: district lines.
Alternatively, in 2017, Delegate Marcia Price (D-Newport News) introduced House Joint Resolution No. 696, called "Proposing an amendment to
Section 6 of Article II of the Constitution of Virginia, relating to apportionment; certain prohibitions; scope of legislative privilege."129 This plan is
124

See DALEY, supra note 5.
Tracy Jan, Iowa Keeping Partisanship Off the Map, BOSTON GLOBE, (DEC. 8, 2013),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/12/08/iowa-redistricting-takes-partisanship-outmapmaking/efehCnJvNtLMIAFSQ8gp7I/story.html.
126 Public Policy in Iowa, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Redistricting_in_Iowa#cite_noteiowaloyola-33 (last visited Oct. 12, 2017).
127
See S.J. Res. 280, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
128
IOWA CONST. art. III, § 36.
129
H.R.J. Res. 696, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
125
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most similar to the “silver” Florida-style plan discussed above. The resolution would have amended Article II of the Virginia Constitution by adding
three new subsections. The first of these would prohibit the drawing of districts for the purpose of favoring or disfavoring any political party, incumbent legislator or member of Congress, or potential candidate.130 This language closely mirrors the language of Florida’s “Fair Districts”
Amendment.131
Florida’s example reminds us that even when constitutional criteria exist,
leaving redistricting in the hands of redistricting stakeholders (legislators)
means an inherent conflict of interest is always possible. Thus, the other
two additions contain language that go beyond Florida’s scope: protections
132
for minorities and reductions in the scope of legislative privilege. First,
Delegate Price’s proposed section 6(c) would incorporate Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act into the Virginia Constitution by prohibiting the drawing
of districts to deny the ability of any racial or language minority to partici133
pate in the political process and elect a preferred candidate of choice.
Next, her proposed section 6(d) would except communications or documents made in the process of redistricting from the otherwise broad134
reaching executive privilege.
Delegate Price's bill provides a section on executive privilege due to a
suit filed by OneVirginia2021, on behalf of plaintiffs, against the 2011
135
During the discovery process, several legislaGeneral Assembly maps.
tors, their staffers, and the Department of Legislative Services, all of whom
had been involved in the 2011 redistricting process, refused to produce
documentation and recordings of communications related to that redistricting, citing the Virginia Constitution’s protection of legislative privilege.136
Circuit Court Judge W. Reilly Marchant held that the privilege did not extend to DLS and was not all-encompassing for other parties, and subse137
quently, ordered the production of the requested documents. The Virginia Senators and DLS then asked to be held in contempt of court to enable
them to perform an interlocutory appeal directly to the Supreme Court of
Virginia.

130

Id.
FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 20–21 (codifying Amendments 5 and 6 to Florida’s Constitution).
132 H.R.J. Res. 696, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 H.R.J. Res. 696, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017) (relying on the holding in Vesilind v. Va.
St. Bd. of Elections, 91 Va. Cir. 490 (2016)).
136
See Edwards v. Vesilind, 292 Va. 510, 517–18 (2016).
137 Id. at 515.
131
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The Supreme Court of Virginia vacated in part Judge Marchant’s ruling,
holding that the legislative privilege was extraordinarily broad and applied
to legislators’ discussions both on the floor and “communications integral
to the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, whether in an official legislative proceeding or not.”138 The Court then proceeded to analyze the requested communications to determine whether they were within the “sphere of
legitimate legislative activity.”139 It held that the communications from the
legislators themselves were protected by the immunity, and that communications by others sometimes were covered because there is no categorical
bar on the privilege covering the communications of legislators with third
parties.140 The ruling extends from the same structural makeup that creates
the “binding the hands of future legislatures” problem. Because Virginia’s
General Assembly is all-powerful, the only way to limit its powers and
privileges is to amend the state constitution, which grants it plenary powers.
Delegate Price’s bill would have added these limitations while removing
the veil that shields legislators from the consequences of their malicious intent.
In addition to the bills already discussed, there were three additional bills
introduced in the General Assembly that were worth noting. The first of
these was Senator Louise Lucas’s (D-Portsmouth) Interim Commission bill,
S.B. 846.141 It would statutorily create an interim redistricting commission
and establish criteria for remedial redistricting plans, but would leave the
142
legislative redistricting process untouched. However, if any part of a legislatively enacted redistricting plan were to be struck down by a court as
unconstitutional, the drawing of remedial maps would fall to the interim
143
commission. It would be made up of the appointees of the leadership of
each party in each chamber of the General Assembly, as well as the Auditor
of Public Accounts, the State Inspector General, and the Executive Director
144
of the Virginia State Bar. The decisions of the commission would require
five votes, and their plans would be submitted to the legislature for approv145
al.
Critically, the bill establishes criteria which would have to be followed by the interim commission, including a prohibition on drawing districts with the intent of favoring any political party, challenger, or

138

Id. at 528.
Id. at 527–35.
140
Id. at 534–35.
141
S.B. 846, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
139
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146

incumbent. It would also prohibit the use of political data in the crafting
of the district lines, except where necessary to comply with the Voting
Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend147
ment.
Another bill worth noting is Senator George Barker’s (D-Fairfax) bill,
S.J. 260, which would have amended the Virginia Constitution to establish
an independent redistricting commission.148 It would require districts to be
drawn in a way that encourages competitiveness and conforms to the rela149
tive partisan performance of past elections in the Commonwealth.
Its
membership would be two members each appointed by the leaders of both
political parties in each chamber of the General Assembly, creating an
150
even-numbered commission. Any map ultimately produced by the commission would require a three-fourths majority vote, and the two plans with
the most votes in favor would be submitted to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which would certify to the Secretary of the Commonwealth one of the
151
two plans. Because the bill lacked any criteria by which districts must be
drawn (except for competitiveness), OneVirginia2021 declined to endorse it
in the 2017 session.
Finally, Delegate Ken Plum’s (D-Reston) bill, H.J. 628, would have created a redistricting commission.152 This is the same bill that was introduced
originally in 1982, and would establish membership in the same way as
153
Senator Barker’s bill. However, the key difference between Barker's bill
and Plum's is that Plum's would add six additional members: four for the
party who won the governorship in the last election and two for the party
154
who came in second in the most recent gubernatorial election.
This
would create a partisan commission with an imbalance (8-6) in favor of the
party holding the Governor’s Mansion. These fourteen members would then
select an independent person to serve as the fifteenth member and chair of
155
the commission, who could break theoretical 7-7 ties. The bill is heavy
on procedure and transparency rules, but does not include any criteria which
the commission must follow in creating new maps.
146

S.B. 846, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
Id.
148
S.J. Res. 260, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
H.J. Res. 628, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
153
Compare H.J. Res. 628, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017), with S.J. Res. 260, 2017 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
154
H.J. Res. 628, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2017).
155
Id.
147
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C. Advice to the Next Governor of Virginia
As of this writing, Virginia has three main choices for its next governor:
Republican Ed Gillespie, Democrat Ralph Northam, and Libertarian Cliff
Hyra. Given the status of the Bethune-Hill re-hearing and potential ruling
by the end of 2017, Virginia may be under court order to redraw the eleven
156
majority-minority districts at issue in the case.
This would be the first
major issue before the 73rd Governor of Virginia. Then, in 2021, the last
year of their term, the Governor will oversee the decennial redistricting.
Based on the history and issues presented by gerrymandering, and the solutions proposed by OneVirginia2021 or suggested in General Assembly
bills, the next Governor should consider several key trends happening
around the country when deciding how to proceed with redistricting in Virginia. The first trend is the rolling back of majority-minority districts into
157
minority-opportunity districts under Cooper v. Harris. The other trend is
state legislatures voluntarily giving up or minimizing their influence in the
redistricting process. While the first recent wave of redistricting reform
came in citizen initiatives throughout mostly western states, the second
wave of reform has come through eastern state legislatures in the past five
years. For example, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo changed the Empire State’s process in 2012 for the upcoming 2020 redistricting cycle.158
Ohio Governor John Kasich shepherded through legislation in their state
house that enabled Ohio voters to overwhelmingly approve a referendum
for redistricting reform in November 2015.159 Further west, Nebraska’s
unicameral legislature passed redistricting reform 29-15, but Governor Pete
Ricketts vetoed the plan several days later.160

156
Graham Moomaw, U.S. Supreme Court orders reexamination of Virginia General Assembly racial
gerrymandering case, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH (Mar. 1, 2017),
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/u-s-supreme-court-orders-reexamination-of-virginia-generalassembly/article_1e33e1b7-6b65-5f35-a7ce-0fde991a5daf.html.
157
See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. 1455.
158
Governor Cuomo Announces Passage of Constitutional Amendment and Legal Statute That Permanently Reforms Redistricting Process, N.Y. ST. (Mar. 15, 2012),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announces-passage-constitutional-amendment-andlegal-statute-permanently-reforms.
159
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Alternatively, if the court in Bethune-Hill orders a redraw of eleven
packed majority-minority House of Delegates districts, it remains likely that
court will grant the legislature some window of time to remedy the violation itself. However, replacing a racial gerrymander with any other type of
gerrymander goes against the desires of the people of Virginia. Reformers
like OneVirginia2021 see this as an opportunity for a test run of a commission. This test-commission would not be mandatory, because a constitutional amendment is impossible in this time, but it could become de facto mandatory if the Governor pledges to veto any map the General Assembly
sends his way that did not come from the commission. While the testcommission would be merely advisory, this test run would lend significant
credibility to such a process. The other component of the commission’s
credibility would come from the fair, non-partisan group of people serving
on it. The McDonnell commission from 2011 can serve as a good template.161
There are three potential options in this veto scenario. One possibility is
that the General Assembly overrides the Governor’s veto with a two-thirds
majority in each chamber and passes a gerrymandered map. This scenario
seems unlikely given the strong support for redistricting reform in the Senate of Virginia and the partisan parity in that body. Equally unlikely, given
the House of Delegates' leadership’s current opposition to reform, is their
adoption of a map from the advisory commission. The most likely scenario
if the Governor vetoed the legislature’s gerrymandered remedy is that the
time would run out on the court’s window for a legislative remedy. This is
what happened in 2015 in Personhuballah, when the court gave Virginia
until September 1st to remedy the racially gerrymandered third congressional district.162 When the legislature and Governor were unable to agree
on a map, the time expired and the court reclaimed the right to remedy the
163
violation.
This is when the power of the advisory commission - or any quality maps
from transparent and reliable sources - comes into play. The court, and any
special master appointed by the court to draw the lines, will have those
maps before them as potential remedies. The strength of their maps, transparency, and the integrity of the process could serve as persuasive exhibit in
the remedy phase of any trial.

161

McDonnell, supra note 19.
Simone Pathé, Uncertainty Reigns as Court Takes Over Virginia Redistricting, ROLL CALL (Aug. 18,
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This same logic of the advisory commission supported by a veto is the
best chance to stop gerrymandering in 2021 in Virginia, short of a constitutional amendment. The current decade has seen a major uptick in redistrict164
ing litigation.
With the arms race between the parties over redistricting
currently ongoing, the next cycle promises a continuation of this litigation.
A quality advisory commission supported by a governor’s veto could prove
to be a temporary winning formula for states in the next redistricting cycle,
which will buy more time for more permanent reforms.
CONCLUSION
Gerrymandering has a long and storied history in Virginia. From Patrick
Henry to the present day, Virginians of all ideological stripes have dabbled
in this darkest of political arts. But reformers are organizing, and only together can we eliminate this scourge from the commonwealth once and for
all. With brave politicians from both parties in the General Assembly leading the charge for reform, the future looks bright. If the momentum of recent years is indicative, the authors’ hopes are high that the 2010s will be
the last time Virginia will ever be gerrymandered.

164
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